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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant and Respondent are not, nor have they ever been, married to each other. 
The Appellant and Respondent have two minor children in common, specifically, Zebadiah 
Evans, whose date of birth is and Videaliah Evans, whose date of birth is 
Appellant and Respondent's original child custody order was entered April 8, 2008, wherein they 
shared joint legal and physical custody, with an alternating week on, week off parenting 
schedule. On December 23, 2009 Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipulated child 
custody and support agreement, due to Appellant's enrollment in college. The December 23, 
2009 Stipulation Agreement granted Respondent primary physical custody of the minor children 
during the school year, and Appellant primary physical custody in the summer months. The 
Stipulation Agreement was formed solely due to Appellant's unavailability while attending 
college classes. On January 5,2010, pursuant to the December 23,2009 Stipulation Agreement, 
the Magistrate court entered its Order re: Child Custody and Support. Due to unforeseen 
circumstances, Appellant did not enroll in school. Subsequent to the January 5, 2010 order, 
Respondent served the retained jurisdiction program for a felony DUI (his fourth or lifetime 
DUI), and was placed on four years' supervised probation. While the Respondent was senring 
the Retained Jurisdiction, the Appellant moved to Newman Lake, Washington, closer to her 
. Appellant, on May 3, 10, filed a motion to modify the January 5, 2010 Order to a 
substantial, material and permanent change in circumsta.'1ces, and requesting primary, 
custody. The motion to proceeded to trial on October 5,2010; and 
Custody, entered October 5, 201 the Magistrate Court found that Appellant failed to a 
1 
substantial, material and permanent change in circumstances in order to justify a modification of 
January 5, 2010 custody order, and dismissed the case. Pursuant to LA.R. 12.2, Appellant 
appeals the Magistrate Court's decision and now submits the following Reply Brief in support of 
her original argument. 
II. ISSlJE PRESENTED 
1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion to modify by finding 
that Appellant failed to establish a material and substantial change in circumstances? 
ANSWER: YES 
III. LA W AND ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In awarding custody, the welfare and best interests of children are of paramount 
importance, and the court is required to provide for them as it deems necessary or proper to 
achieve this end. LC.§32-717; Schmitt v. Schmitt, 83 Idaho 300, 305, 362 P.2d 884,887 (1961). 
Once a custodial order is entered, the party seeking to modify it must first demonstrate that a 
material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of 
custodial order. Osteraas v. Idaho 350, 859 P.2d 948 (1993). Wilen reviewing an 
exercise of discretion Court lower cou..'i rightly perceived the issue 
as one discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries such discretio:1 
2 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
[The Supreme] Court will not attempt to its judgment and discretion for that of 
the trial court except in cases where the record '-'d'-~""'CJ a clear abuse of discretion. Levin v. 
Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 836 p.2d 529 (1992); Biggers v Biggers, 103 Idaho 550, 650 P.2d 692 
(1982). An abuse of discretion occurs where there is insufficient evidence to support the court's 
finding regarding the best interest of the child. Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 746 P.2d 1016 
(1987). A trial court's finding of fact will be upheld if there is substantial and competent 
evidence supporting them. Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, p.3d 1234 (2008). The party 
seeking modification has the burden of justifying a change in custody, and although the threshold 
question is whether a [material] and substantial change in the circumstances has occurred, the 
paramount concern is the best interest of the child. Biggers, 103 Idaho 550, 650 P.2d 692; Cope 
v. Cope) 98 Idaho 920, 576 P.2d 201 (1978). 
B. Appellant can establish that the Magistrate Court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Appellant failed to make a sufficient showing that there was a 
material and substantial change in circumstances. 
response to Appellant's original brief, Respondent argues that the Magistrate Judge did 
not her discretion in finding that Appellant failed to show a substantial and material 
circumstances. In support this Respondent states that the substantial and 
change in circumstances cited in Appellant's May 3,2010 Iv10tion to Modify an Order 
or Decree was "Father is incarcerated at the North Idaho Correctional Institution in Cottonwood, 
VoU, p.4S). This fact is uncontested. Appellant's argument and the decision ofthe 
court regarding a material and substantial change of circumstances were not based on 
Respondent's incarceration status. At the August 17, 10 Motion and Scheduling Conference 
Magistrate Judge, of her own initiative, brought to the attention of the parties the more 
change in circumstances; the fact that Appellant will no longer be attending school. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p.9, L. 20. A court is not confined by the allegations of the petition to modify in 
seeking out what custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child. McGriff v . 
. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 99 P.3d III (2004). Appellant's argument and the decision of the 
Iv1agistrate Judge in the October 5, 2010 Court Trial was based on Appellant's changed student 
status. Respondent's incarceration status was not addressed relative to a material and substantial 
change in circumstances. This alteration follows from the Magistrate Court's findings on August 
17,2010. Accordingly, the controlling question in [aJ case where the judge made findings as to 
best interests of the children largely outside of those changes originally alleged ... is whether 
evidence supports the findings made by the magistrate as to a change of circumstances and 
the best interests of the children were served by considering a modification of the 
arrangement." M~cGriff, 140 Idaho 642, (2004). 
In support of his 
Requests for Admissions: 
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Request 
this case; 
Admission 1: Please admit that you decided not to to school because 
Request for Admission 2: Please admit that you intend to enroll/and or attend school 
when this case is completed; 
Request for Admission 3: Please admit that you moved out of the state ofIdaho in 
reliance on the Stipulation in this case. 
Through naivety and not neglect, in her Pro-Se representation, Appellant failed to 
respond to Respondent's Request for Admissions. Pursuant to LR.C.P § 36, Request for 
Admission 1 and Request for Admission 2 were deemed admitted by the Court. Request for 
Admission 3 was not addressed by the court, and is immaterial to this case. Regardless of the 
above, the Magistrate Judge's decision that Appellant failed to make a sufficient finding that 
there was a material change in circumstance between the January 5, 2010 Order and Appellant's 
May 3, 2010 Motion to Modify an Order or Decree was not based on above admissions. The 
Magistrate's decision was based on her conclusion that Appellant's securement of full-time 
place of attending school did not constitute sufficient significance to justify a 
order. Tr. II, p.24, 8. 
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Respondent's Requests for Admission are not relevant to the decision Magistrate. 
\Vhat is relevant is that the Magistrate's October 5, 2010 decision directly contradicted 
her prior statement in August 17, 2010 Motions and Scheduling Conference whereupon the 
understanding that Appellant would no longer be attending school, The :Magistrate Judge stated 
"Well, that's a fairly change in circumstances." Tr. Vol. 1, p.9, L.2o. Reemphasizing 
Appellant's original argument; The Magistrate Court cannot dismiss Appellant's Motion to 
Modify the January 5, 10 Custody Order upon a finding of no substantial and material change 
in circumstances, when she previously found that there was a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. For this reason, and the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully requested of this 
Honorable Court that this case be reversed and remanded to the lower court for a finding 
consistent with the above facts. 
C. Appellant can establish that the Magistrate Court abused its 
The 
discretion as there is insufficient evidence to support the Magistrate Court's 
finding regarding the best interest of the children. 
Court failed to make a finding in the best interest of the children. 
Respondent concedes this fact, however argues; that because the Magistrate Judge did not find 
that there was a material, substantial and permanent change of circumstances that the Magistrate 
was not required to consider the best interests of the children. Respondent's IS vvrong 
in both logic a.'1d . Authorities indicate that such a change in CirCU1TIstances is a 
to custody award modification. By example; v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 836 P.2d 529 
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(1 However; the effect of a change in circumstances on the minor children involved is a 
significant factor in determining whether such change constitutes a material, substantial 
permanent change of circumstances. As such, any change in circumstances must consider 
best interest of the children. In Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977) the court 
carefully analyzed these two rules of law and placed them in proper perspective. Quoting from 
Posey as follows: 
"While material, permanent and substantial change standard is a sound legal 
principle, care must be exercised in its application. The tendency is to search for some 
greatly altered circumstance in an attempt to pinpoint the change called for by the rule. 
Thus, the emphasis is placed on defining some change, and making that change appear, 
in itself, to be material, permanent and substantial. This focus is misleading. The 
important portion of the standard is that which relates the change in conditions to the best 
interest of the child [emphasis addedJ. The changed circumstance standard was 
designed, as a matter of policy, to prevent continuous re-litigation of custody matters. 
That policy goal, however, is of secondary importance when compared to the best 
interest of the child, which is the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings 
[emphasis added]. The court must look not only for changes of condition or 
circumstance which are material, permanent and substantial, but also must thoroughly 
explore the ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is 
evident. What may appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in 
circumstances may have significant effects insofar as children are concerned [emphasis 
added]." Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258 (1977). 
The Magistrate Judge in the August 17,2010 Motions and Scheduling Conference stated that 
Appellant's changed enrollment status was a "fairly significant change in circumstances." Tr. 
Vol. 1, p.9, L.20. In the October 5, 2010 Court Trial, The Magistrate Judge holding to 
contrary stated " ... the change is that you're not going to school and you're working full 
the broad discrepancy in the Magistrate Judge's 
evaluation of Appellant's VH1.Hvl.ll statu.s, such enrollment status indicates a.n evident change 
7 
in circumstances. "The Court must look not only for changes of condition or circumstance 
which are material, permanent and substfu"1tial, [the court] also must thoroughly explore the 
ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident. What may 
appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in circumstances may have significant 
effects insofar as children are concerned [emphasis added]." Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258 
(1977). The fact that Appellant will no longer be attending classes is a material and substantial 
change of circumstances. The effect of Appellant not attending classes is a material and 
substantial change of circumstances. 
The Supreme Court will not attempt to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the 
[lower] court in resolving whether to modify child custody, except in cases where the record 
reflects a clear abuse of discretion, which occurs where there is insufficient evidence to support 
trial court's finding regarding the best interests of the child [emphasis added]. Brownson v. 
Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 995 P.2d 830 (2000). vVhen reviewing an exercise of discretion the 
Supreme Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Brownson, 134 Idaho 60 (2000). 
In our present case, it is that Magistrate to apply best 
standard in its modification of evaluation. A court must consider the best 
8 
interest of the minor child[ren] when making determinations, and when analyzing this 
[among other factors] consider: ... The character and circumstances of all individuals 
... and need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child. LC.§32-
717(1). As a result of the Magistrate Court's failure to apply the best interest standard the above 
1''0'''1.,.-',""0 were not taken under consideration, 
As date, and as the October 5, o Order re: Child Custody, Respondent is 
on supervised felony probation for four years following his Retained Jurisdiction Program for a 
Felony DUI; that conviction being his fourth or fifth lifetime DUt Respondent has a history of 
"very heavy drinking", as emphasized by the Honorable Judge Heise. Tr. Vol. 11, p.25, L.4. If 
Respondent violates his probation, he is facing a term of imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. 
Although Respondent is working to reform his behavior, there is still a significant risk of relapse 
that should not be minimized. Respondent has an alarming history of alcohol abuse. This pattern 
in Respondent's life is a significant factor and creates vulnerability in his ability to promote 
continuity and stability with the parties' minor children. 
The following exchange between The Magistrate Court, Respondent's Attorney, a.'1d 
Appellant took place during the October 5, 2010 Court Trial: 
The Court: Why was Mr. Evans the pen? 
Mr. Featherston: It was for a felony 
Appellant: His fourth or 
Mr. Featherston: He did a rider and is on at 
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Court: I don't ... I don't know ifI was thinking clearly when I gave ... you know 
I it was agreed to in January, 2010." Tr. Vol. II,p.19, L. 3-13. 
not spelled out word for word in the October 5, o Court Trial Transcript, it is 
apparent that the Magistrate Judge significantly questioned custody in Respondent as a 
result of his criminal history. The fact that Appellant will no longer be attending school, is in a 
stable and healthy home environment, will be working full time and is available during non-work 
to provide for the care of her children establishes a custody option that better facilitates the 
best interest of the children. To disregard this fact is to disregard reason 
Four times Respondent cites to Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002) stating: "A 
magistrate's findings of fact, however, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and not clearly erroneous." Reed, 137 Idaho 53 (2002). The Magistrate 
Court failed to support its findings with substantial and competent evidence. The Magistrate 
Court did not reach its' decision by an exercise of reason. There is no evidence to support the 
Magistrate Court's finding regarding the best interests of the children. The best interest standard 
was not even applied. For the reasons state herein, the Magistrate's finding is clearly erroneous. 
It is respectfully requested of Honorable Court that the Magistrate Court's decision be 
reversed and remanded to the lower court for a finding consistent the above facts. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Substantial and material changes have occurred since the entry of January 5, 2010 
Order re: Custody and Support. Specifically, Appellant will not be attending college. 
This change was recognized and identified by the Magistrate Judge at the August 17,2010 
Motions and Scheduling Conference as a "significant change in circumstances." Tr. Vol 1, 
p.9, L.20. Appellant's non-student status significantly changes Appellant's capacity to care 
for her children. More importantly, this change makes the custody order currently in place 
no longer in the best interest of the children. [The Court] "must thoroughly explore the 
ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident." Posey, 
98 Idaho 258 (1977). The recognition of an evident change prompts the duty to consider the 
best interests of the children. Only upon consideration of the effect of an evident change on 
the parties minor children (i.e., consideration of the children's best interest) can a 
determination of whether a material, substantial and permanent change exists be rationally 
made. For reasons stated herein and at length above, it is respectfully requested of this 
Honorable Court that the Magistrate Court's decision be reversed and remanded to the lower 
court for a finding consistent with the above facts. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of April, 2011. 
John 
Attorney for Appellant 
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